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 Building the Exchange process: The antecedents of operational exchange in 
collaborative business to business relationships 
 
Attention in the alliance literature has developed from a focus on strategic alliances and joint 
ventures to a broader focus including marketing based alliances such as co-marketing, co-
development (Crespin-Mazet and Ghauri, 2007). In doing so the empirical literature has 
followed the tide of practitioner activity that has flowed from manufacturing and associated 
rigid structures, to a greater emphasis on service and alliance roles that are typically less pre-
defined. This brings with it a general emphasis on short-term task-specific interactions 
between firms. These are, by their nature, characteristically collaborative and frequently non-
equity arrangements. In these contexts strategy can be emergent and outcome measures 
uncertain at the outset, with the result that the process of exchange usurps discrete 
performance outcomes as a true measure of efficacy. Clear understanding of this process of 
exchange and the antecedent conditions responsible for effective exchange is much needed 
yet lacks proper attention and clear explanation in the literature. Explanation is commonly 
couched in a buyer – seller dyadic context with a transaction costs emphasis (Heide, 2003, 
Parkhe, 1993, Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003, Williamson, 1985, Yilmaz and Kabadayi 
2006), and where relational perspectives are explored this is frequently an extension of 
transaction costs logic with attention to ‘transaction costs, [ ] and high asset specificity’ 
(Bunduchi 2008). Attention is also given to interdependencies between partner firms 
(Bunduchi 2008) and information exchange (Sobrero and Schrader 1998) but these are 
frequently set out as explanations of forbearance under conditions of uncertainty further 
demonstrating a transaction costs perspective. A fuller explanation of successful collaborative 
exchange requires a departure from this logic towards one in which the nature of exchange 
will be knowledge-based rather than property-based (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009), one 
 which can facilitate an understanding of the antecedent conditions of this ‘intensive and 
reactive rhythm’ (Crespin-Mazet and Ghauri 2007) and one that responds to calls for research 
in the understanding of the development of these exchange norms (Palmatier 2007). 
 The present study seeks to address this gap by conceptualizing exchange behaviour 
among collaborating non-hierarchical firms. This operational exchange process is described 
from a social exchange perspective. This conceptualization marks a departure from the 
transaction costs logic providing an explanation of the social exchange process and is a 
central contribution of the study. The antecedent conditions necessary for successful 
operational exchange receive little attention in the literature. A further contribution of the 
present study is the modeling of these conditions as antecedents to operational exchange.  
 Non-equity collaborative alliances were taken from the UK construction industryand 
analysed through Structural Equation Modeling using AMOS software. The measurement 
model was assessed for reliability using construct reliability and Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
with both measures giving values above .70 (Nunnally 1978). Convergent validity is 
demonstrated through confirmatory factor loadings > .51 for each item on its respective 
construct, and average variance extracted values for each construct above >.50 (Fornell & 
Larcker 1981). The confirmatory factor analysis showed that the proposed factor model had a 
good fit to the data with CFI and NNFI values above 0.90, and a RMSEA value indicating an 
acceptable fit (Byrne 2001), 2(46)=83.773, p=0.000, CFI=0.96, NNFI=0.96, RMSEA=0.07.  
 The results give support for the hypothesised relationships between prior relational 
and relational capital and compatibility among partner firms and relational capital. These 
variables form the antecedent conditions for successful operational exchange between 
partners which is presented as the outcome variable in this study. The study contributes to 
understanding of the function of operational exchange as an on going reciprocal process by 
clarifying the distinction between this and a discrete transaction perspective of exchange. A 
 further contribution of the study is the identification of firm size as a negative moderator of 
compatibility on relational capital. In larger firms the function of compatibility in this 
antecedent arrangement is muted and this effect is explored in the study. 
Managerial implications abound, however specific deliverable messages centre on the 
importance of relationship capital in facilitating a barrier-free exchange of valuable 
information as an ongoing feature of a successful alliance exchange process. Prior close 
relationships across social contexts aid the development of relational capital. A desire for 
fairness and transparency may lead decision makers to under value existing social 
relationships in professional contexts, however social capital aids the exchange process in 
collaborative business to business alliances and there are benefits in acknowledging and 
accommodating this. Compatibility is central to avoiding negative influences on the 
development of relationship capital. Commonly held as a pre requisite among alliance 
partners this is less variable among larger firms and remains a particular area for attention in 
smaller firms. 
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